Criminal appeal and specification of its motives: analysis of the Italian Supreme Court jurisprudence on the control of appeal admissibility

Abstract

Considering the decision 8.825 of 2016, this article analyzes the position of the Italian Supreme Court concerning the inadmissibility of the appeal because of the defect of the specificity of its motives. At least provisionally, there has been a definition in the debate between those who maintain that such motives must be specific, as imposed on the “cassazione”, and who, considering the devolutive nature of the appeal, maintains that the reasons which justify the appeal can be understood with less rigor than in the judgment of legitimacy, by virtue of the principle of favor impugnationis. In view of a general scenario of misunderstandings, disorientation and contrasts of jurisprudence, uncertainties and superficial analysis paradigms, it is therefore questioned whether the current normative frame is sufficient to guide the interpreter in the application of the criteria for which the admissibility examination must develop. Finally, this scenario will be analyzed in comparison with the Brazilian regime and the guidelines of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in order to verify possible contributions of the Italian discussion.