Power asymmetry in the democratic transition and the design of Brazilian judicial review
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5335/rjd.v34i3.12290Keywords:
Asymmetry, Constituent, Constitutionalism, Democratization, PowerAbstract
This article discusses the causality between the power asymmetry verified in the 1988’s constituent and the design of the Brazilian judicial review. The article begins with the debate about political transition process and the explanatory hypotheses for the relationship between democratization and constitutionalism. Then, analyses the constitutional jurisdiction as a central institution of the Democratic Constitutional State, considering the factors of tension and conciliation between democracy and constitution. It concludes with the defense of the thesis that the 1988 National Constituent Assembly was characterized by low power asymmetry, which resulted in the decisive expansion of judicial review and its establishment as a normative pillar of Brazilian democracy.
Downloads
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
All articles are licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivations 4.0 International license.