Moralization of politics and institutional imbalance: some effects of the Supreme Court's activity on Brazilian democracy

Abstract

Liberal democracies depend on a balance of powers and political agreements, which, violated, risk fundamental rights, minorities, popular participation and governance. Since these conditions are constitutional content, a good way to protect them is the constitutional jurisdiction. In the case of Brazil, the government system developed into a coalition presidentialism: the governability depends on political agreements, and the Supreme Federal Court is responsible for overseeing its institutional limits. However, the court has tried to correct the national politics, moralizing and modifying it (according to its perceptions). This behavior leads the court to go beyond its limits, becoming a factor of instability. To support such perceptions, this study discusses: the concepts of liberal democracy and consensus; the relationship between coalition presidentialism and democracy; the political function of constitutional jurisdiction. Finally, it raises some relevant decisions and institutional behavior to, on an exploratory basis, indicate that the STF has destabilized Brazilian democracy.