Improvement of the WTO Dispute Settlement System Effectiveness and the Monetary Compensation
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5335/rjd.v37i1.14254Keywords:
suspension of concessions; efficaciousness; dispute settlement system; WTO; DSB; monetary compensationAbstract
This article examines the effectiveness of the suspension of concessions or other obligations taking into consideration the interpretation of the objectives of that measure by WTO doctrine and case law. In order to access if the suspension of concessions contributes to the effective implementation of the WTO DSB decisions and recommendations, the article adopts the theoretical concept of technical efficiency. Departing from an argument based on WTO doctrine and on the analysis of cases adjudicated by the WTO DSB, in which the measure was applied, the study demonstrates a mere partial efficaciousness of the suspension of concessions for the DSB compliance procedure. In this regard, it is suggested that the DSU adopts the institute of reparation, present in the International Public Law, aiming to stablish the obligation of indemnify the damages caused throughout the dispute settlement procedure, due to the continuation of the illegal practice by the transgressor member. The article concludes, therefore, with a proposal for including the retroactive monetary compensation in the DSU, in order to reinforce its compliance procedure and offering more effectiveness to the WTO DSS.
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
All articles are licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivations 4.0 International license.


