Revisiting the judgment of the Raposa Serra do Sol Indigenous Land in the light of the Theory of Law
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5335/rjd.v35i3.12323Keywords:
Teoria do direito, Positivismo exclusivo, Hermenêutica jurídica, Supremo Tribunal Federal, Raposa Serra do SolAbstract
This article analyzes the legacy and decision of the Raposa Serra do Sol case by the STF based on elements of law theory, both the exclusive version of Joseph Raz's positivism and interpretive theories, especially the contribution of Ronald Dworkin. With a high degree of discretion and influences on other cases, this decision makes it possible to assess the lack of positioning of exclusive positivism on the way the Brazilian Constitutional Court operates in some difficult cases. At the same time, it is clear that interpretive theories do not seem to abstain from this confrontation, contributing to the improvement of judicial decisions based on the epistemic constraint on bad decisions.
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