Revisiting the judgment of the Raposa Serra do Sol Indigenous Land in the light of the Theory of Law

Authors

  • Dailor Sartori Junior Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, Unisinos, RS

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5335/rjd.v35i3.12323

Keywords:

Teoria do direito, Positivismo exclusivo, Hermenêutica jurídica, Supremo Tribunal Federal, Raposa Serra do Sol

Abstract

This article analyzes the legacy and decision of the Raposa Serra do Sol case by the STF based on elements of law theory, both the exclusive version of Joseph Raz's positivism and interpretive theories, especially the contribution of Ronald Dworkin. With a high degree of discretion and influences on other cases, this decision makes it possible to assess the lack of positioning of exclusive positivism on the way the Brazilian Constitutional Court operates in some difficult cases. At the same time, it is clear that interpretive theories do not seem to abstain from this confrontation, contributing to the improvement of judicial decisions based on the epistemic constraint on bad decisions.

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Author Biography

  • Dailor Sartori Junior, Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, Unisinos, RS

    Doutorando em Direito pela Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos - UNISINOS (bolsa CAPES/PROEX). Mestre em Direito pelo Centro Universitário Ritter dos Reis - UniRitter (bolsa CAPES). Bacharel em Direito pela Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul - UFRGS. Especialista em Ética e Educação em Direitos Humanos pela UFRGS. Advogado. E-mail: dailorjunior@gmail.com

Published

2021-12-30

How to Cite

Revisiting the judgment of the Raposa Serra do Sol Indigenous Land in the light of the Theory of Law. (2021). Law of Justice Journal, 35(3), 102-127. https://doi.org/10.5335/rjd.v35i3.12323